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This paper presents a model based on the Nash bargaining for shing quotas
and wages between shing communities and vessels, focusing on two cases:
(a) the shing communities are not environmentally conscious and ignore the
external damages caused by the shing industry emissions, and (b) the shing
communities are environmentally conscious, and the external damages caused
by the shing industry emissions a¤ect their bargaining position in the shing
quotas market. Between other it is argued that, in developing economies,
where normally the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is relatively strict compared
to the communitys needs, the communitys degree of environmental awareness
has no e¤ect on social welfare. In developed countries the social welfare is
higher when the shing community is environmentally conscious provided a
slow decrease in consumptions marginal utility relative to the rate at which
the marginal environmental damage increases. Finally, the communitys utility
and the vessels prots depend on the strictness of the total allowable catch.
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1 Introduction
The sheries industry is linked to the exploitation of open-access renewable natural
resources and, ever since Hardin published in 1968 "The Tragedy of the Commons,"
sheries sustainability has been the focal point of numerous studies. However, more
recent empirical studies have shed light on a di¤erent dimension of the environmental
problem facing the sheries industry: air pollution from internal combustion engines
in operating shing boats. According to Tyedmers et al. (2005) sheries account
for about 1.2% of global oil consumption, an amount equivalent to that burned by the
Netherlands, the 18th-ranked oil consuming country globally, and directly emit more
than 130 million t of CO2 into the atmosphere, and according to Greer et al. (2019)
Global CO2 emissions from the main engine combustion of fuel in marine sheries
amounted to approximately 207 million t of CO2 in 2016, compared to 47 million
t of CO2 in 1950. In 2016, the industrial sector released around 159 million t of
CO2, i.e., 4.1 times more than in 1950 and accounted for 77% of global CO2 emis-
sions from marine sheries. In comparison, the small-scale sector released around
47 million t of CO2 in 2016, 5.8 times more than in 1950. Furthermore, Waldo and
Paulrud (2016) noted that policy instruments for sheries management concentrate
on sheries sustainability and do not take into account other external costs like the
shing boats emissions of CO2.
A widely used policy instrument to regulate the shing industry is that of Indi-
vidual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). In ITQs systems the regulating authority sets a
total allowable catch (TAC) of one or more species (e.g. pollock, cod, halibut, crab),
divides the TAC into quota shares, and distributes them to individuals. Such quotas
are transferable, i.e., can be bought, sold, or leased. In practice, often the regulating
authority distributes the shing rights (quotas) to local shing communities orga-
nized in the form of shing cooperatives (henceforth, shing community and shing
cooperative will have the same meaning). Therefore, a Community Fishing Quotas
(CFQs) is a special type of ITQs system where the quotas are initially grandfathered,
i.e., allocated free-of-charge, to a shing community. The shing community may af-
terwards sell or lease quotas to shing boats (rms-vessels) or choose not to use them.
Therefore, the regulator, along with the community, are managing the sheries and
protect the ecosystem against degradation (e.g., Pomeroy and Berkers, 1997; Baland
and Platteau, 1996). The rationale behind such systems is founded in the shing
communities interest for the sustainability of the environment that, according to
Charles, 1994, include the four cores of sustainability, namely, Ecological, Socioeco-
nomic, Community, and Institutional sustainability. It is not uncommon that shing
communities are environmentally conscious (see for example www.coastalvillages.org
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and www.alaskapollock.org/sustainabilty.html.) and they consider the external cost
imposed upon the society in the form of environmental damage even if the policy
instruments for the management of the sheries do not. Besides, the sheries and
communities sustainability "depends largely on the intrinsic characteristics of so-
cial, economic, and legal systems" (Criddle, 2012). CFQs systems have been applied
in Alaska, USA1 as well as in various developed and developing countries like Ger-
many, Norway, Iceland, Japan, Chile, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia,
Namibia etc.2 Although the same policy instrument is applied by both developed
and developing countries, shing communities in these countries seem to adopt dif-
ferent strategies. For example, Benkenstein (2014), notes that in Namibia the quota
owners prefer to directly lease their quotas "to established companies - essentially
a risk-free cash-for quota exchange" than to make "costly investments in vessels,
processing infrastructure and marketing activities." However, Alaskan shing com-
munities usually adopt the latter strategy.
Aim of the present study is to analyse the e¢ciency of CFQs systems with respect
to the environmental damage caused by the emissions of the shing industry in the
presence of environmentally aware shing communities. In this spirit, we explore the
bargaining process for shing quotas between the shing community and the vessels
focusing on two cases: (a) the shing community is not environmentally conscious
and ignore the external damages caused by the shing industrys emissions, and (b)
the shing community is environmentally conscious, and the external damages caused
by the shing industrys emissions a¤ect their bargaining position in the shing
quotas market. Although there is a plethora of studies with respect to the agricultural
and shing cooperatives, the bargaining between environmentally friendly shing
communities and rms-vessels for the sale of shing quotas and the possible outcomes
have not been explored.3 We try to cover this gap in the literature and analyse this
case from both an economic and a policy/regulators viewpoint.
We follow the E¢cient Nash Bargaining model (e.g., Espinosa and Rhee, 1989;
McDonald and Solow, 1981; Vannini and Bughin, 2000) between a shing community
and a vessel and we examine how the community, through the bargaining process,
can inuence the output and employment levels, the rms prots, and the wages.
Our analysis takes into account two alternive scenarios. In the rst -benchmark- case,
1http://alaskasheries.noaa.gov/cdq/ (date access 05.02.2019).
2For more details see Strehlow, 2010; Castillo and Dresdner, 2013; Jentoft and McCay, 1995;
Raakjaer Nielsen and Vedsmand, 1995; Nasuchon and Charles, 2010; Evans et al., 2011; Huggins,
2011; Benkenstein, 2014; Kirchner and Leiman, 2014.
3For further analysis on shing cooperatives see Barrett and Okudaira, 1995; Baticados, 1998;
Deacon, 2012; Unal et al., 2009.
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the community ignores the environmental damage caused by the shing industrys
emissions. In the second case, the communitiy is environmentally aware of this
environmental damage and reacts against it. Therefore, the possible outcomes are
explored under di¤erent behavioural assumptions about the members of the shing
community (Oczkowski, 2006; Bateman et al., 1979). Such behavioural di¤erences
can be justied on the ground of di¤erences in the stage of economic development.
The game is simultaneous where both, the vessel and the community, decide the
number and price of the shing quotas exchanged, the employment level, and the
wages.
Between other it is argued that, in developing economies, where normally the
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is relatively strict compared to the communitys needs,
the communitys degree of environmental awareness has no e¤ect on social welfare.
In developed countries the social welfare is higher when the shing community is
environmentally conscious provided a slow decrease in consumptions marginal utility
relative to the rate at which the marginal environmental damage increases. Finally,
the communitys utility and the vessels prots depend on the strictness of the total
allowable catch.
2 Background
2.1 Fishing communities and shing quotas
The interesting characteristic of the CFQs, and the main di¤erence from the Indi-
vidual Fishing Quotas4, is the leading role of the community in the nal allocation
of the shing quotas. Fishing communities are traditional shing villages, sheries-
dependent communities, that are traditionally organized into shing cooperatives,
and they are the owners of the quotas. For example, according to Strehlow (2010)
in Germany the quotas ... are distributed among the sheries cooperatives, which
in turn distribute their quotas among their members. As it is noted in Pomeroy
and Berkers (1997) [f ]isheries managers increasingly recognize that a shery cannot
be managed e¤ectively without the cooperation and participation of shers to make
laws and regulations work.... Co-management systems have emerged as a partnership
4There is a large literature for the theory and the application of the Individual Fishing Quotas
or Individual Transferable Quotas. For an extensive analysis on the Individual Fishing Quotas and
for the application of rights for the management of sheries in various countries see Clark et al.,
1988; Dupont et al., 2005; Emery et al., 2012; Hannesson, 1991; Huppert, 2005; Kristofersson and
Rickertsen, 2009; Laxe, 2006; Newell et al., 2005; Yagi and Managi, 2011 as well as Walden et al.,
2012.)
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arrangement using the capacities and interests of the local shers and community,
complemented by the ability of the government to provide enabling legislation, en-
forcement and conict resolution, and other assistance. Ginter (1995) note that the
CFQ program ...is of interest as a form of individual transferable quota manage-
ment which explicitly recognizes the special needs of communities as distinct from
business rms or individual. For example, according to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOOA) the CFQ systems applied in Alaskan sheries
aim (i) to provide eligible western Alaska villages with the opportunity to participate
and invest in sheries in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area; (ii)
to support economic development in western Alaska; (iii) to alleviate poverty and pro-
vide economic and social benets for residents of western Alaska; and (iv) to achieve
sustainable and diversied local economies in western Alaska.5
As mentioned earlier, the shing communities have the right to sell or lease quotas
to vessels operating in the shing area. Manseld (2007) claims that the innovative
element of the Community Development Quotas6 (CDQ) systems ... is that quota
is not designed so local people benet directly by catching and using the sh (ie use
value), but instead quota is marketable (ie exchange value). CDQ groups may not sell
their quota outright, but the program is designed for them to lease their quota to non-
CDQ rms already active in the industry; these rms now pay CDQ groups for the
right to catch sh. By the early 2000s, annual revenue for all CDQ groups combined
was around US$70 million, with most income from leasing quota.... Therefore, there
can be negotiations between a shing community and a third party (i.e., a non-
community vessel) for shing quota. The shing community could earn additional
income by selling/leasing unused quotas for a specic period to the vessel. On the
other hand, the vessel needs quotas in order to claim shing rights in a particular
shery.
2.2 Fishing communities, shing quotas and employment
Members of the shing community are working on vessels as a crew or in the shing
industry as processors and distributors. According to National Research Council
(1999) [s]ome residents of the CDQ communities have participated in the halibut,
sablesh, crab, and groundsh sheries as crew members, skippers, or vessel owners
and according to Lowe (2008) [a]lthough some owned their own crab boats, many
5For more information see http://www.alaskashereis.noaa.gov/sheries/cdq (date access
15/02/2019).
6The CFQ systems applied in Alaskan sheries are called Community Development Quotas
(CDQ) systems.
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Aleutian locals worked as deckhands and some eventually as captains on large-boat
crab boats that came to the locality from the outside. Large-boat owners never settled
in the Aleutians, preferring to sh in the Bering Sea and return home to ports such as
Kodiak, Seattle, and Newport, Oregon. Thus, their wellbeing depends on the vessels
wealth, productivity and protability and as it is mentioned in National Research
Council, 1999 In addition to money, CDQ groups were also interested in obtaining
jobs for residents, given that unemployment is a serious problem. Therefore, sheries
sustainability is not a biological problem, it is a social problem (Criddle, 2012).
Hence, it is obvious that the employment level in shing communities is strongly
and directly connected with the number of the quotas the vessels will purchase/lease
from the local shing communities. The question is if and how the environmental
concern that characterises some shing communities could have an impact not only on
the vessels prots but also on the employment level as well. Although we explore this
question and we build the model based on the above characteristics it is interesting
to mention that in collective quotas system in Chile the quota distributed to guilds,
trade unions, communities and cooperatives (Castillo and Dresdner, 2013). Thus, the
relation between unemployment and quotas could be strongly connected through the
allocation of the quotas but could be more complex since there are more players in
the market with di¤erent characteristics. In the next section we analyse the models
for the two cases. In the section 4 we compare the results from each case in order to
focus on the regulators preferences and we include results from comparative statics.
Finally, section 5 includes the conclusion.
3 The basic model
We consider a shing community that has been grandfathered all the quotas in a
specic shery and a non-community rm (vessel) which is a potential buyer of
quotas. The vessel is a prot maximizing business while the community acts as a
bargaining agent (Oczkowski, 2006). These two parties bargain for wages and shing
quotas following a Nash bargaining approach. As in Hatcher (2005b), the analysis is
based on a simple and given -short run- period model under a single species shery.
Therefore, the short run prot function for the vessel is given by
 = pq   C (1)
where p is the price of the good in the market (the price of the sh) with p = a  bq
and a is the size of the market, a > 0 and a > bq. Also, q (q > 0) is the level of the
production (quantity of harvested sh) and b the parameter.
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Since the harvested quantity of sh depends on the number of the shing quotas
belong to the vessel, the harvested quantity q can be lower or equal to the TAC
(see also Arnason, 2009). Hence, noting the TAC as q we have q  q. If q = q
the shing community will lease all the quotas to the vessel. We consider this to
be a representative example of how communities trade shing quotas in developing
countries. For example, for the case of developing economies like Namibia Huggins
(2011) claims that "...[r]ights are leased under the guise of chartering vessels. The
services of processing and marketing the catch are also included in the contract. The
operating company pays the fee and the quota holder (i.e., small holding company) has
nothing to do with the quota for the rest of the year." Similarly, Benkenstein (2014)
states that "...[t]he central problem, outlined in 2014 by Kirchner and Leiman, is that,
although shing rights are non-tradeable in Namibia, rights holders are permitted to
lease their quota to established rms. Namibians who have been awarded shing
rights and allocated quotas as part of the governments empowerment drive are faced
with the choice of making costly investments in vessels, processing infrastructure
and marketing activities or directly leasing their quota to established companies 
essentially a risk-free cash-for quota exchange. Given these incentives, it is to be
expected that many beneciaries of the Namibianisation policy will opt to lease their
quotas or become passive partners in joint ventures with larger, established rms."
At national level the price of sh depends on the quantity that will be harvested
by the vessel(s). Thus, contrary to Hatcher (2005b) in our model the shing vessel is
a single price making rm. In that case, it is clear that the shing communities do not
have the power to inuence the price at national level (at least directly) since they
will not use the quotas for shing but for revenues/leasing. This approach is in line
with the assumptions and the analysis from Oczkowski (2006) and Helmberger and
Hoos (1962). Specically, the above studies have assumed that the shing comunities
do not make prots but only exists for the members" (Oczkowski, 2006). Therefore,
the community cares for the well being of its members implying a community interest
about employment level and wages.7 In addition, the revenues from the leasing of the
quotas could be re-allocated between the members which could be the communitys
surplus according to Oczkowski (2006).
The total cost for the vesel is C = wL + rq where w (w > 0) is the wage of the
workers, members of the community and L the number of the workers. Furthermore,
we assume marginal product of labor equal to L = kq with k > 0 .8 In addition,
7Similar with the trade unions targets and in line with the National Research Councils (1999)
statement as it is described in the previous section.
8For a similar approach with k = 1 see for example Asproudis and Gil Molto, 2015 and Manasakis
and Petrakis, 2009.
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r (r > 0) is the price of the quota or the cost for the vesels in order to purchase
each shing quota. Contrary to Hatcher (2005a) and close to Anderson (1991) we
assume that both the vessels and the shing communities have power in the quotas
market while the vessels are price makers in the output market. Particularly, in
Hatcher (2005a) the vessels are price takers in the quota and in the output market
but in Anderson (1991) the vessels have market power in the output market with
one dominant price maker rm in the quotas market.
The CFQ community cares for the wages and for the number of the workers
as well as for the revenues from the sale of the unused quotas at price r. Since a
quota gives the right to the vessel to harvest a specic quantity of a specic sh
(species) for a particular period, then quotas and output can be the same. Simply,
one quota represents the right to the vessel to harvest one tonne of a sh (e.g.,
pollock, cod, halibut, crab). Moreover the utility function of the community is based
on a typical Stone-Geary function with reservation wage equal to zero.9 Furthermore,
we introduce the income from the sale of the unused quotas to the utility function
UNC = wkq + rq +R where the superscript NC indicates that the community does
not care for the protection of the ecosystem. The parameter R is the income that
the communities have from their shing activities. Simply, they will rent some of
the unused quotas to the foreign vessels and they will use some (used quotas) for
themselves in order to catch sh for private consumption or for local trade. For
simplication reasons and without lose of generality we normalise this to zero.10
The CFQ communitys interest for the environmental concern or environmental
protection is represented by the introduction of the damage function in the utility
function. The damage to the environment which caused by the CO2 emissions by
the use of burning fuels. The damage function is D = eq2 where e is the damage
parameter. That is, the utility function for the environmentally friendly community
is UC = wkq + rq   eq2 where the superscript C indicates that the community is
environmnetally conscious.
9For simplication reasons and without loss of generality we assume that the reservation wage
or the wage from a competitive industry is equal to 0 (e.g. Lommerud et al., 2005, Mukherjee et
al., 2007, Mukherjee, 2008 and Asproudis and Gil Molto, 2015). In other words, the members of
the cooperative cannot nd another job and they do not have the skills to work in a di¤erent sector.
Thus the utility function is UNC = (w w0)L where w0 is the reservation wage equal to 0, Hence,
UNC = wL. However, the introduction of the reservation wage into the formula does not have any
qualitative e¤ect on the results.
10A possible extention on this equation is to add the prots from shing to the utility function and
therefore the question for the community/shing cooperatives will be how much quotas to rent out
and how much to retain. However, the model is more complex and the equations are characterised
by non-tractability results.
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Provided our denitions of the communitys utility, the rms prots, and the
damage function, the social welfare can be derived as the sum of the vessels prots,
the communitys utility including the environmental damage, and the consumers
surplus in the produt market. Therefore, it is straightforward to show that SW =
PS + CS + U  D = (a  (1=2)bq   eq) q.
Roberts (2007) assumes that the "...workers have identical preferences and identi-
cal outside opportunities." In our study the outside opportunities are equal to zero
since the reservation wage is assumed to be 0. However, in our study, and in order
to focus on the bargaining for CFQs and on the social welfare, it is assumed that
all the members of the community care equally for the environmental quality.These
assumptions are in the spirit of Solstad and Brekke (2011) "The point of departure
is a traditional harvesting model: a well-dened group of individuals that jointly own
and exploit a natural resource" and in line with the assumption from Damania and
Fredriksson (2000) "Assume that all consumers join an environmental lobby group,
and thus all individuals in society are organized" where in our case the consumers are
the members of the community and the environmental group is the shing commu-
nity. Hence, there is a collective action without free-riders .11 Following Oczkowski
(2006) we assume zero payo¤ for disagreement point. Finally, it is assumed that,
independently of reaching an agreement or not, there is no xed bargaining cost.
3.1 The Benchmark case: Non-environmental conscious sh-
ing community
The communitys utility function is
UNC = wkq + rq (2)
Following the Nash bargaining the vessel and the community will decide the amount
of the exchanged quotas, the price of quotas, and the wage12. Therefore, the max-
imisation problem is given by
max
q;w;r
UNC = Log(pq   wL  rq)m(q(wk + r))1 m (3)
s.t. q  q
where m 2 (0; 1) is the bargaining power.13
11For further analysis on the collective action problems see Ostrom, 2010.
12The wage and the price of quotas can be thought of being negotiated as a package.




case 1: Assume that q = q, i.e., all the available community quotas are leased
to the non-quotas holders, as in the case of developing countries (e.g., Namibia). In
summary, we get the following results about output, wages, prots and utility
qNC = q (4)
wNC =
(1 m) (a  bq)  r
k
(5)
NC = mq(a  bq) (6)
UNC = (1 m)(a  bq)q (7)
Furthermore, the price of output, the number of workers, the pollution damage, and
the social welfare are









= (1=2) (3a  (3b  2e)) q (11)
Non-negativity constraints imply that a > 2q, ab > 2q, a > 2bq and m < a bq r
a bq
.
Comparative statics reveal that the wages, the vessels prots, the communitys
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case 2: Assume that q < q, i.e., not all the available community quotas are
leased to the non-quotas holders, as in the case of developed countries (e.g., USA).
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3.2 Environmental conscious shing community
When the shing community is environmentaly conscious its utility function is given
by
UC = wkq + rq   eq2 (20)
Hence, the maximisation problem is described as
max
q;w;r
UC = Log(pq   wL  rq)m(q(wk + r)  eq2)1 m (21)
s.t. q  q




case 1: Assume that q = q. It can be shown that output and wages are
qC = q (22)
wC =
(1 m) (a  bq)  r + emq
k
(23)
Therefore, prots, utility, output price, labour, environmental damage, and social
welfare are
C = mq(a  (b+ e)q) (24)
UC = (1 m) (a  bq) q + emq2 (25)









= (1=2) (3a  (3b  2e)) q (29)
Non-negativity constraint requires that a > (b+ e)q.
Comparative static results are similar with the benchmark case for q = q. Specif-
ically, the wages, the vessels prots, the communitys utility, and the social wel-
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Comparative statics reveal that the wages, the output, the vessels pro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In this section we compare the results from the two models, focusing on di¤erences
in prices, damages, prots, utility equations, wages, output/quotas and number of
workers as well as the social welfare. Di¤erences in the latter might have important
policy implication for the regulator.
4.1 Prots and Utility
For q = q
13
Calculating prot and utility di¤erences between the cases of environmental con-
scious and non-environmental conscious community we get NC   C = emq2 and
UNC   UC =  emq2 implying that NC > C and UC > UNC . Intuitively,
when the community is environmentally conscious will sell fewer quotas to the vessel
and this will lower the vessels prots while raising the communitys utility.
Lemma 1 When q = q, the community yields higher utility and the vessel earns
lower prots when the community is environmentally conscious.
This result is in agreement with the claim of Besley and Ghatak (2005) that
the environmentally conscious community has a mission oriented character and it is
willing to sacrice part of its materialistic wellbeing to protect the environment.
For q < q
We calculate NC   C = a2em
4b(b+e)
so, NC > C and UNC   UC = a2e(1 m)
4b(b+e)
then UNC > UC8m 2 (0; 1).
Lemma 2 When q < q, the community yields higher utility and the vessel earns
higher prots when the community is not environmentally conscious.
4.2 Wages and Quotas - Output - Employment
For q = q
With proper calculations we get wNC   wC =   emq
k
thus, wNC < wC but
the output/employment level is the same for both cases since q = q, hence LNC =
LC = kq.
Lemma 3 For q = q the wages are higher if the community is environmentally
conscious.
The explanation is that the green-community could internalise the externalities
into the wages. The members may appreciate that the overshing will have a negative
impact not only to the environment but also to their jobs since the environmental
degradation could be a threat for the sustainablity of the future jobs in the shing
sector of the area. Thus, the increase of the wages could reect the price or forfeit
that the vessel will pay in order to hire the green members/workers. Additionally,
the statement could indicate that the members are willing to accept to work in shing
vessel, which cause a damage to the environment, for better wages (for a similar case
see Asproudis and Gil Molto, 2015).
For q < q
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We calculate wNC   wC =   ae
2k(b+e)
thus, wNC < wC . Also, for the case of
the output/employment the di¤erence is qNC   qC = ae
2b(b+e)
hence qNC > qC .
Similarly, = aek
2b2+2be
implying that LNC > LC .
Lemma 4 When q < q the wages are higher if the community is environmentally
conscious. However, production and employment are higher if the community is not
environmentally conscious.
4.3 Prices and Damages
For q = q
It is straightforward that pNC   pC = a  bq and DNC = DC = eq2.
For q < q
Proper calculations yield pNC   pC =   ae
2(b+e)
so, the price is lower if the shing
community is not environmentally conscious and DNC DC = a2e2(2b+e)
4b2(b+e)2
hence, the
damage is lower if the community protects the ecosystem. It is not surprising that
the price of the sh is lower under the existence of a non- environmentally conscious
shing community. Simply, the community will sell more shing quotas to the vessel
and the quantity of the harvested sh will be larger compared with the analogous
results if the community protects the environment.
4.4 Social Welfare
For q = q
We calculate the di¤erence SW
NC   SW C = 0.
Proposition 1 In developing economies, the social welfare is not a¤ected
by the shing communitys environmental consciousness.
Therefore in the case of developing countries the regulator has no clear prefer-
ence on whether the shing community is environmentally conscious or not. This is
an interesting result from the regulators perspective: shing communities environ-
mental preferences are irrelevnat when deciding the allocation of quotas and/or the
maximum TAC.
For q < q
We calculate SW
NC   SW C = a
2e(2b2 eb 2e2)
8b2(b+e)2
. Observe that the sign of this







Proposition 2 In developed countries the social welfare is higher when the shing
community is environmentally conscious provided that the rate at which the marginal
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utility of sh consumption decreases is not too high compared to the rate of increase
in environmental marginal damage.
Contrary to the proposition 1, in the case of the developed countries the regulator
needs to take into account the rate at which the environmental marginal damage
increases. Both propositions give important information for the possible outcome of
the social welfare and furthermore indicate that the policy maker, in order to achieve
the optimum result, should take into account the behaviour of the shing community
(environmentally friendly or not).
All the previous results are summarized in the next tables:
Non-environmentally Environmentally
conscious community conscious community
 mq(a bq) > mq(a  (b+ e)q)




(1 m) (a  bq)  r + emq
k
q q = q
L kq = kq
SW (1=2) (3a  (3b  2e)) q = (1=2) (3a  (3b  2e)) q
p a bq = a bq
D eq2 = eq2
Table 1: Summary of the results and comparison for q = q
Non-environmentally Environmentally











































Table 2: Summary of the results and comparison for q < q
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5 Conclusions
We analyse the bargaining for shing quotas between two players (a shing commu-
nity and a non-community vessel) following a Nash bargaining approach and based
on the application of the Community Fishing Quotas (CFQ) for the protection of the
sheries. The CFQs is a co-management system where the regulator together with
the local communities will manage the sheries and the sustainability of the ecosys-
tem. Nevertheless, the participation of the local communities in the management of
the sheries has triggered a lot of discussion and criticism for the e¢ciency of the
co-management system (e.g. Jentoft, 1989, 1990; Jentoft et al. 1998; Pomeroy and
Berkers, 1997; McCay, 2004)14
Scope of the research is to explore the bargaining from the regulators viewpoint
and to contribute to the discussion for the e¢ciency of the co-management system.
Therefore, we explore two cases, based on the real market, which are important for
the e¢cient of the CFQs and for the policy of the regulator. Particularly, in the rst
case we assume that the community does not have any interest for the protection
of the environment. In the second case we assume that the shing community is
characterised by environmental friendly objectives and concern for the conservation
of the environmental quality. In addition, we explore the application of the CFQs
from both developed and developing countries.
Between others it is argued that, for the developing countries the communitys
degree of environmental awareness has no e¤ect on social welfare but the community
yields higher utility, its members earn higher wages, and the vessel earns lower prots
when the community is environmentally conscious. On the other hand, in developed
countries the social welfare is higher when the shing community is environmentally
conscious provided that the rate at which the marginal utility of sh consumption
decreases is not too high compared to the rate of increase in environmental marginal
damage. Moreover, the wages are higher if the community is environmentally con-
scious. However, the community yields higher utility, the vessel earns higher prots,
production and employment are higher when the community is not environmentally
conscious.
These results are very signicant for the decision-maker and for the e¢ciency
of the Community Fishing Quotas system. The regulator, when deciding the al-
location of quotas to shing communities, may need to consider the communities
environmental interests and concerns.
Finally, although this study is based on the application of the CFQs it could be
14See also Bowles and Gintis, 2002 for a more general analysis and review for the role of the
communities in governance.
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extended and generalised for the application of the permits market for the reduction
of emissions (e.g. CO2, SO2) since the two systems (shing quotas and emission
permits) have very similar characteristics.
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